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Approved For Release 2009/08/20 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300470009-5 DEVAEI 90546 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Confidential WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500 July 21, 1982 WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER II Executive Secretary Department of State DAVID PICKFORD Executive Secretary Department of the Treasury LTC RICHARD HIGGINS Assistant for Interagency Matters Office of the Secretary of Defense Stephen Shipley Executive Assistant to the Secretary Department of the Interior Jean Jones Director, Executive Secretariat Department of Commerce WILLIAM V. VITALE Director, Office of the Executive Secretariat Department of Energy WILLIAM SCHNEIDER Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs Office of Management and Budget THOMAS B. CORMACK 25X1 Executive Secretary Central Intelligence Agency ROGER PORTER Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development BENJAMIN ZYCHER Special Assistant to the Chairman Council of Economic Advisors COL GEORGE A JOULWAN Executive Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff SHEILA DRYDEN Special Assistant to the Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Results of NSSD 9-82 Overview Group Meeting of July 20, 1982 SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT SEURE Review 21 July 1988

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The Overview Group meeting of NSSD-9-82 on July 20, 1982, agreed upon the following follow-up actions in preparation for our next Overview Group Meeting the week of August 2:

- 1. CIA should (1) update Sections A, B, and C to reflect current intelligence, (2) ensure that the discussion on pages 9 through 26 relates to specific disruption scenarios listed in the attached table, (3) further refine the scenarios to demonstrate the potential supply impacts of a gradual escalation in the current Iran-Iraq hostilities, and (4) add a "likelihood" column to the scenario table which would indicate other countries capable of taking military action resulting in closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
- 2. CIA should undertake additional work to develop potential disruptions likely to occur over the next six months. Special attention should be focused on events which could reduce excess capacity, cause an inventory turnaround, neutralize additional production from Saudi Arabia and/or Kuwait.
- 3. OMB and CEA should work together to develop numbers relating to the macro effects of the supply disruptions discussed in Section D. Over the next week to 10 days, CEA should meet with OMB and NSC to try to enumerate some of the problems associated with the existing models.
- 4. OMB, in revising the micro effects discussed in Section D, should include a qualitative discussion of the numbers used in the model relating to stock draw and demand elasticities. The analysis should be revised to include the possibility of a net stock build during a minor supply disruption. CIA should provide OMB with some thoughts on the rationale for considering that a 3 million b/d stock draw during a major crisis is not sustainable over the course of a full year.
- 5. DOS should analyze more precisely in Section D, foreign governments' responses to supply disruptions. This analysis should describe more fully (pages 5-9) the range of policies foreign governments might pursue in dealing with disruptions and the type of varied market responses one could expect in these countries based on existing policies. CEA agreed to work with State in preparing this analysis.

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6. DOD should, in its part of Section D, (1) elaborate on past experience -- particularly the political pressures generated by the purchase of higher priced oil, and (2) elaborate on the effects of certain disruptions on military stocks.

CIA is reponsible for integrating the above sections.

Before the next Overview Group meeting, the Chairmen of Working Groups involved in Part III of the study, along with other interested participants, will meet to discuss the outline and tasking for Part 3 of the NSSD Study. The next Overview Group meeting, which will probably be set for the last week of July or the first week of August, will be devoted entirely to Part III. It will also consider detailed outlines of Part IV of the study.

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Michael O. Wheeler

Staff Secretary

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